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Making the Grade: Some Principles
of Comparative Grading
Jeffrey Evans Stake
While 1 was a law school student, one teacher attempted to give grades of D
or F to a large portion of his first-year class. Did he not know-I wondered-
that it was statistically much more likely that his grading had changed than it
was that the effort and ability of a class of 125 students was radically different
from the effort and ability of his other recent first-year classes?' Upon joining
the law teachers, I found that most colleagues were concerned about their
grading but had spent little time thinking about how their grades fit into the
context of marks given by their peers. They had not considered whether
grading practices that would be benign standing alone could be problematic
in that larger context. Most of us teach that process is important, but in some
ways we do not practice what we preach. We spend little of our faculty energy
overseeing our institutional process of calculating summary statistics such as
grade point averages and class ranks.
This article is an attempt to bring important grading issues to the attention
of law teachers. I hope to establish certain principles of comparative grading,
what teachers should do in assigning grades to students and what schools
should do in establishing grading scales and combining grades into grade
point averages. I will set out, and offer some justification for, five grading
principles-equalize means, equalize standard deviations, use numerous grade
intervals, maintain proportional intervals, keep the no-credit grade reason-
ably close to the mean-and one corollary, avoid grade inflation. In part I,
I mention briefly a few reasons that grading is worth our attention. In part II,
I admit a few assumptions, some issues that will be left unexplored. In part III,
the heart of the paper, I discuss the principles of grading set out above and
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For helpful comments, I thank Pat Batude, Ken Dau-Schmidt, Terry Denny, Bob Heidt, Steve
Heyman, Joe Hoffmann, Eric Rasmusen, Lauren Robel, Robert Stake, and Marjorie Young.
Michael Alexecv, Mitu Gulati, and Russell Korobkin offered extensive and pointed written
comments. John Applegate read it. twice, something I would not ask of anyone. I thank Gerry
Spann for encouraging me to turn my thoughts into this article. Articles in education journals
have used "Making the Gr ade" in their titles, but in\' research assistant could not find that title in
the law reviews.
1. Another possibility is that his students had learned less than earlier students because his
teaching had changed. The question whether a terrible teacher should be allowed to give low
grades is the flip side of whether a good teacher should be allowed to give high grades, an
issue discussed below.
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some possible exceptions to the principles. My brief conclusion is not in-
tended to be the end, for I do not pretend that my thoughts will be the last
word on any of these topics.' My goal in publishing this article is to start a
discussion from which we can learn more about this weighty dimension of our
responsibilities as teachers and faculties.
I. Why Do Grades Matter?
Before discussing the principles, some might want to take a step back and
ask why we should bother. After all, grades say little. Grades generally purport
to tell only who performed better and who performed worse on an instrument
of assessment, usually a single exam or paper. To generate a bit of the in
terrorem effect, many of us say that we will include class participation, but in
most large classes it does not end up counting for much. Test results explain
most of the variation in grades. The nearly ubiquitous grade point average is
usually just a weighted average of all of a student's classes, a numerical
combination of incommensurable grades measuring various dimensions of
ability and learning. And class rank is normally derived from GPAs. Being
based entirely on grades, these statistics add no new information to the thin
account published in the individual grades.
Although grades, GPAs, and class ranks contain specific messages that are
quite limited, they are read to mean more. Our grades communicate broader
meanings to the students and their potential employers. The signals we send
to students relate to both whether they are studying well or enough, and
whether they have the aptitude for a career in the law. Grades can influence
the ways students think about themselves, swelling their heads or shaking their
confidence. Student members of law journals use first-year grades to deter-
mine, to a large extent, which students will be invited to share the benefits of
the law review experience.
Some believe that one of our most useful functions as law teachers is to sort
students for their employers.' And whether or not it is our purpose to sort,
grades do have that effect. Employers act as if grades reflect aptitude for being
a lawyer. Many of the most prestigious and high-paying firms limit their hiring
to students above a specified grade point average or class rank, or limit their
interviews to students who are on a lawjournal, which is usually determined in
part by grades. Grades and law review also determine who will have a chance to
clerk for a judge, which is helpful both for developing legal skills and for
2. Nor do I mean to imply that mine are the only principles. For methods of adjusting GPAs, see
Lawrence.]. Stricker et al., Adjusting College Grade-Point Average Criteria for Variations in
Grading Standards: A Comparison of Methods, 79. Applied Psychol. 178, 178 (1994) ;John
W. Young, Grade Adjustment Methods, 63 Rev. Educ. Res. 151 (1993).
3. 1 have elsewhere advocated richer descriptions of student performance. Jeffrey E. Stake,
Who's "Nnmber One"?: Contriving Uniditnensionality in Law School Grading, 68 Intl. L.J.
925 (1993). See also Michael E. Levine, Toward Descriptive Grading, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 696
(1971). Class rank does add useful information otr a reader who does not know all of the
other GPAs at a school, but it does not add informnation to that contained in all of the GPAs.
4. See generally Michael Spence, Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and
Related Screening Processes (Cambridge, Mass., 1974); Richard A. Ippolito, The Sorting
Function: Evidence from Law School, 51 1. Legal Educ. 533 (2001).
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gaining entrance to certain careers, such as law teaching. For our part, when
we act as employers of new faculty, we law teachers spend little time reviewing
the applications of C students. Grades affect which students win the honors
and which are eliminated from some career tracks. We can argue about the
degree to which grades matter, but few doubt that grades do matter.
Because law school grades send messages, messages that open and close
doors, it is obviously unfair to say students performed differently when they in
fact performed the same. It is also unfair to a higher-performing student to say
that she performed the same as a student who performed much less well.' Of
course two students rarely perform exactly the same, so there is always some
unfairness in using the same grade twice, but that unfairness grows with the
difference in their performances. Finally, and somewhat less obviously, it is
unfair for a teacher to say that Sally performed "much better than"Jane, and
Jane performed "better than" Dick, when in fact the difference between Dick
and Jane was the same as the difference between Jane and Sally. Of course the
same unfairness can occur in the context of GPAs and ranks as well as with
individual grades.
In addition to being unfair, inaccurate communication via grades can also
be inefficient because it misleads employers and it fails to set up appropriate
incentives for students. A discouraged student may drop out of school. An
unduly encouraged student may gain a false sense of confidence that he can
do legal work without as much preparation as others. An employer may miss
an opportunity to interview a student who would have been best for the job.
Grades would hardly serve the sorting function if they were assigned ran-
domly. At the extreme, inaccurate grading could lead firms to ignore our
grades,just as many have learned to ignore our references.6 Even if we do not
care much about whether our grades facilitate efficient hiring, we should care
if our grading practices drive frustrated employers to other schools for their
new hires.
Although much of the discussion in this article relates to the goal of
accurate communication, there is another important normative goal that is
implicated by teachers' grading practices. Differences in grading methods
create incentives that influence students in important educational choices.
Students, and even their counselors, pay attention to the ways teachers grade;
the grades teachers have given in the past are a factor when students pick their
courses. For many students, it does not matter that most teachers would like
students to exclude expected grades from their course-choosing calculus.
Students also pay attention to our grading practices when they allocate their
limited time for studying. Again, teachers would prefer that students not study
more for one course simply because of the teacher's grading methods. The
failure of teachers to adopt consistent grading practices influences student
behavior in ways that teachers find undesirable.
5. I t can also be unfair to a student to tell him that he performed better than he did. Students
need to know when they did poorly,jUst as they need to know when they did well.
6. I have been listed as a reference on scores of rsurn6s, but I can count on one hand the
number of times I have been called by potential employers.
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For all these reasons, it is our Citify, to our students and their employers, to
avoid miscommunication in the messages we send about how students per-
formed. But how? Law teachers employ many different approaches to grad-
ing. Some of tis add up points. Others use a gestalt method, holistic and
sometimes intuitional, assigning a final letter grade without having assigned
numerical scores at any stage of the process. Some teachers combine these
methods by assigning initial points and then adjusting the final score in light
of a complete rereading of the exam. Others take the opposite tack, assigning
gestalt grades, but adjusting those up or down for particular points made or
not. Many faculties include teachers from a number of these camps. However
we generate the initial scores, does it help to draw lines in the gaps? Does it
help for a school to prescribe a curve? Does grade inflation do any harm? The
principles discussed here should apply to teachers in every camp and to all
schools that either combine grades into grade point averages or publish
grades that others will combine into grade point averages.
II. Assumptions
This article proceeds on a number of assumptions, many of which raise
questions that are substantial enough to deserve articles of their own. In
addition to those listed below, I am sure that other assumptions are important
to the arguments I will make. But the list below should be sufficient to warn
the reader of the type of question that I will leave tinexamined.
1. Grades commiunicate relative pelorman ce.
I assume that grading communicates inkormation about a student's perfor-
inance relative to the performance of other students in the same school.7 Not
all teachers employ grades to this end. Some view grades as carrots and
sticks-which indeed they always are, whether or not so intended-without
any regard to the assessing and sorting fnictions. Other teachers, probably a
minority in law but a larger percentage in other fields, see grades as actual
measures of achievement on criteria that are absolute, not referenced against
other students' performance. Such teachers adopt standards for each grade in
the grading scale and then assign grades on the basis of whether students have
exceeded the announced standards. In theory, their grades could be the same
for all students in a class-all high, all low, or all in the middle. But even these
teachers understand that their grades will often be read comparatively. And
even if no one reads an individual teacher's grades comparatively, those
grades will in all likelihood be combined into a GPA which will be used to
make comparisons between students.,
7. It might be the case that stidarncrdization of grading would have the benieficial effect of
making the process seem tess arbilr ay to stocenlis, white at the same time making it clearer
that they are heiig graded il Comparison to their peers. Stich increased claity might iiake it
easier for a Stident to acCet) the disconcerting a:Lcts hat lie received a high grade oil all
exani that he did not feel good about and receivedt a low grade of] al exalti that he thouight
he had nailed.
8. tf ( 1 ) a leacher does [iot wanlt to allow the possibility that her grades will be read compar-a-
tiv0ly to ineluencc her critelrion-referenced or incentive-hased grading, (2) she does not
combine subscores to get a total grade, and (3) her grades are not included inl any si0Iimar%
statistic calculated by her school, she iliight find riich of this aiticle irrelevant to her grading.
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2. Few readers know the grading practices of the individual teachers assigning the
grades.
Employers and other readers of law school transcripts do not have the
information or the time they would need to figure out what grades mean for
individual teachers. A few hiring partners at local law firms might know that
Softy gives high grades and Curmudgeon gives low grades, but most will not be
able to make such individualized adjustments when they read transcripts or
rnSsums. Many will be able to do no better than assume that the A- from
Curmudgeon reflects a lower performance than the A from Softy, or that a B
means the same thing to both.
3. 1 assume that teachers do indeed vary in their grading practices.
Even when they seek shared goals, even when they are partially constrained
by rules and customs, some teachers award lower grades, some higher. Some
spread the grades widely, some bunch them together on the grading scale.
There is some evidence for this assumption that teacher-to-teacher variation
has not been squeezed out of the grading process. Paul T. Wangerin finds
that "dramatic differences in the definitions of letter grades exist within a
single part of the university and even within different sections of the very
same course."!)
4. The impossibility of peifection in grading does not obviate error reduction.
I assume that grading is never perfect. If it were, many points of this article
would be moot. But our assessment instruments will never be precisely able to
measure student ability, or learning, or anything else relevant to performance
as a lawyer. Subjectivity in grading will never be eliminated. Exam coverage
may not be what we want it to be. Neither essay questions nor true/false exams
give us an undistorted Picture of the real abilities of our students to perform as
legal professionals. No test is perfectly reliable or valid.
Even though there are large problems that can never be solved, we shall
continue to grade students, giving them marks that they and others will read
as meaning something about their accomplishments or abilities. I also assume,
on the other hand, that grading is not so defective that improvement is
pointless. We should take due care to prevent the errors we can eliminate and
minimize the cost of the errors we cannot eliminate. The fact that our exams
are not perfect measurement instruments is no excuse for saying that one
student performed better than another when the opposite is true.
5. Schools will continue to sum incommensurable grades.
Because different assessment instruments measure different aptitudes and
learning, a B in the four-hour Property course does not mean the same thing
as a B in the four-hour course on Criminal Law. Yet, despite their differing
meanings, the two grades have the same effect when schools calculate GPAs
9. Calculating Rank-in-Class Numbers: The Impact of Grading Differences Among Law School
Teachers, 51_J. Legal Educ. 98, 112 (2001). See also Young, sulra note 2.
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and class ranks. " ' Even though different dimensions of performance cannot
truly be aggregated into a single number, we are not about to stop doing it.
And although GPAs have serious limitations, the faults are not so large that
they cannot be made still worse. Some approaches to combining grades will
exacerbate the problems inherent in summary statistics.
In addition to these assumptions, I will note that principles for constructing
assessment instruments are beyond the scope of this article. I will not even
begin to discuss the relative imerits of oral examinations, drafting exercises,
research papers, and essay and multiple-choice tests. Nor will I discuss the
relative merits of points-based or gestalt grading. The discussion here is wholly
about how we turn numbers, be they initial scores or grades, into other
numbers, be they final grades, GPA-s, or class ranks.
III. Principles of Comparative Grading
A. Equalize Means Across Courses
I start with the easiest point: the average grade should be approximately the
same for all courses.'' The reasons for this are obvious. Law schools commonly
sort first-year students randomly into sections. It is plainly unfair for some
students to stiffer lower grades because of a throw of the dice, and especially so
because first-year grades are the most important. That should be reason
enough for teachers of first-year courses to follow similar grading practices.
After the first year, at most law schools, students choose their own courses.
Allowing variation in the average grade in elective courses creates bad incen-
tives for students. In order to improve their GPAs students might choose a
course or section because it has higher grades instead of choosing according
to important educational criteria, such as whether it meets too early in the
morning. The incentive problem affects teachers as well as students. Allow-
ing some teachers to reward their students more generously puts pressure
on other teachers to raise their grades, perhaps resulting in spiraling
grade inflation.
10. 1 have written elsewhere about the incommensurability prohlem inherent in creating grade
point averages and class ranks froni scores in difftrent cotUrses. Stake, supra note 3.
11. For good argtlments in favor of equalizing means and empirical evidence that teachers in
one law school do not give grades with tie same means, see Wangcrin, supra note 9, at 103,
109. There are arguments thai medians should be used instead of means, but medians can be
easier for a teacher to manipulate in undesirable ways. One thing a teacher can do is shift the
grades of some stuidents above the median to higher grades without shifting the median. This
is hard if' the school also controls the standard deviation, but it can be accomplished by
shifting other grades downward. Another undesirable thing a teacher might dto in response
to a forced median is JUst change the grades of a few students near the ttedian, rather than
shifting the whole grading scale to meet the mandate. It is harder to shift the mean by
changing the grades of only a few students because the amount the mean changes is the total
shift divided by the number of students. If grading intervals are large, this is especially unfair
to students whose grades were changed downward by the teacher just to tmake his grades
meet the mandatory median. Notwithstanding these points, there are tradeoffs, and a school
could rationally choose to mandate that all classes have the same tnedian grade instead of the
ttean. Mandating the niedian and the meani along with the standard deviation amounts to
mandating the skewness of the distribution of grades.
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Variation in the average grade also results in unfairness and inefficiency
when grades are combined. The students taking courses in which the teacher
awards lower grades are less likely to qualify for honors, more likely to end up
with a low class rank, and more likely to flunk out of law school entirely. In
short, "the reliability and validity of GPA as a criterion of academic success are
attenuated because the GPA is not comparable for students who take courses
with severe grading standards and students who take courses with lenient
standards."' 2
This equal-means principle should not be adopted unthinkingly or too
rigidly. There is an argument that grades in elective courses should be higher
than those in mandatory courses. Students in electives have chosen those
courses and might be more motivated to study hard or might be particularly
good at doing that sort of study. Electives are usually taken later in schooling,
when students have matured. Especially when all students take the same
mandatory courses, there is little harm in having one average for those courses
and another average grade for elective courses. The grade average for courses
could even vary according to the percentage of students taking the course as
an elective.
13
A further deviation may be warranted if there are a substantial number of
pass/fail students in a course. Such students might not put forth even close to
the same effort as students at risk of receiving a C or D, and their scores will
probably be much lower than the scores of most other students in the class. If
the letter grades given them, before being changed to pass or fail, are in-
cluded in the average for the course, the instructor is effectively getting a free
pass to give the rest of his students much higher grades than usual. On the
other hand, there is also a potential fairness problem if those students' grades
are excluded. They might have been the lowest students in the class even if
they had taken the course for a grade. Eliminating their grades could force
the teacher to give grades that are unfairly low to the regular students in the
class. The best way out of this dilemma is to set the average grade for the
regular students according to their GPAs in previous course work. The perfor-
mance of the pass/fail students can then be judged according to the curve
thus set by the regular students.
I have been asked to address the argument that we should allow teachers to
give higher or lower grades because some teachers teach better. Certainly
teachers are not equal in their effectiveness. We could allow the more effective
teachers to give higher grades as a reward for teaching better. This would add
to the incentives for good teaching, along with salary and other rewards.
Students of better teachers learn more and should perhaps, as a matter of
fairness, get better grades. It would also serve the goal of efficient communica-
tion to allow the better teachers to tell transcript readers that their students
learned more than other students.
12. Stricker et al., supra note 2, at 178.
13. At some schools there are no courses that are elective for some students but required for
others. At Indiana-Bloornington, however, we have courses required forJ.D. students but
elective for students pur suing other degrees; classes include students friom both groups.
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One obvious problem with this rationale for- disparate average grades is that
it is very hard to identify the teachers who teach better. Self-reporting will not
do, as most teachers report that they are better than average,' and if there is
some positive payoff to being a great teacher, most of us Will report that we
qualify'. Unless a teacher can produce decent evidence of better learning on
the part of her students, we should hesitate to accept such a contention as
sufficient to warrant higher grading. And even if a teacher can produce
evidence of better learning, it does not follow ineluctably that his students
should receive higher grades. Law employers often want to know not how
much the student has learned in law school but rather how capable the
student is of learning, compared to the other students in her school. The
student who learned less in the poorer teacher's course may bejust as capable
of learning as the student who learned more in the better teacher's course,
contrary to the implication of the inferior grade. Thus, allowing the grade
averages to vary according to the quality of the teaching might send the wrong
signals to employers. Moreover, when a teacher changes his grading practice
without warning and when the administration randomly assigns students to
courses, the students do not have an opportunity to make informed choices.
In such cases it would be unfair to the students to allow poor teaching to result
in low grades in addition to weaker training than that of their luckier school-
mates. 'I In sum, although there is a logical case for allowing better teachers to
give better grades, such a deviation fron the equal-means principle would be
tinworkable, inefficient, and perhaps unfair.
Another argument lot disparate averages is that the students are better in
some classes. Few would object to giving better students better grades, but
again there is a problem of proof. We all understand that what look like high
scores on an exam do not necessarily mean that the students learned more
than average. The test itself determines whether the students look like they
learned a lot or only a little. In first-year or other mandatory courses, one
teacher's randomly assigned students are not likely to be consistently better
than another teacher's students. Substantial year-to-year variation in students
is possible,' but it is also possible, indeed likely, for a teacher's test or grading
14. Patricia K. Cross found that 86 percent of a sorxeyed grotip of' teachers considered theml-
selves to be better than average. See Not Can, Bit Will College Teaching Be Iproved? 17
New Directions fot Higher Edttc., Spring 1977, at 1, 5-6. It is possible that law teachers have
better awaoleness ottlteitr own cottmpatr ative leaching abilities than those surveyed, bill I see no
reason to believe it. It is also possible tlhat stIdenl evaittatiotIs ltlve piCtcel otl sell-deception
since Cross did het study. There is also sonlie small Chance that Cross's restdlts do not reflect
self-deception or lack of inforllation. If the bad teachers ae much wsorse than most and most
teachers are jnst a little below the best, at teacher .nl fhe median is well above the average.
15. The sttidents of better teachers were ltcky enough tio be assigned to those teachlets. Slottld
the ILIck of the draw be equalized by giving them lower grades?
16. Sul)slantial yeatr-lo-yeM variation is likely only itt very small classes, or when admissions
standards have changed. In the latte case, it could ibe appropriate for a school to change its
iman grade tr those students. Changing tlhe target tttean accordiing to the aptitinde of the
lalltrictillants would ilcilitate comparisons of stlde ts graduating inl diftereli years. If',
however, the Iteanl is increased, the prtblems asstciated with girade in flation, discussed
below, might ensue.
17. This approach was adtiled in the law school context at least its fat back as 1971. See Richard
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to vary from year to year. The teacher at my alna mater who tried to assign a
huge nUmber of D's and F's probably thought the students were much worse
than those in previous years. It is much more likely, however, that his teaching,
testing, or grading mood had changed. Small, ambivalent deviations from the
norm by a teacher might be justifiable, but it is highly unlikely that one
teacher will be randomly assigned better students over a long period of time.
Even supposing, contrary to the odds, that one teacher's randomly assigned
students are above average from year to year, allowing that teacher to grant
consistently higher grades will raise a perception of unfairness and generate ill
will among students. Since in law we care about the appearance of impropriety
as well as its actual existence, we ought to avoid grading that looks unfair.
In the second and third years better students may gravitate to some courses,
and lesser students to others. If that happens, forcing teachers to a single
mean could easily increase miscommunication rather than decreasing it. For
that reason, an exception to the principle of equalizing means might fairly be
made for courses having students with different expected performances. If the
students registering for one class have an average GPA of B+ and the students
registering for another class have an average GPA of B-, the grades given by
the two instructors could account for those differences. 7 Indeed, doing so
could reduce fairness and incentive problems that can arise if some courses
tend to attract students with high grades. 8 Again, where I went to law school,
the course in federal jurisdiction was taken primarily by students who had
high grades. The fact that the class would be full of good-grade-getters dis-
couraged students from taking the course because they feared ending up at
the bottom of the class. If the average grade for the course had been adjusted
to account for the high GPAs of the students registering for it, any student
could have taken the course without fear of harming his GPA. Although it
might appear to students to be unfair that some courses receive higher grades,
that appearance of unfairness could be prevented by explaining to students
the fairness and incentive rationales for the policy.
This discussion would not be complete without an explicit exception for
small classes.'' It is always possible that forcing a teacher's grades to a pre-
scribed mean can have the effect of increasing miscommunication. It is a
matter of balancing risks. Is it more likely that the instruction or evaluation is
abnormal or that the class is abnormal? The chances that some teacher-related
component of the evaluation is abnormal are probably about the same for
large and small classes, even if a teacher devotes less time to constructing the
exam For the small class. By contrast, the chances that the class is actually
abnormal increase as class size diminishes. Hence, the relative risk of error
from forcing a mean upon the graders increases as classes shrink. At some
A. Epstein, Grade Normalization, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 707, 709 (1971).
18. li. at 710 (a student's expected grade in a COurlSc should be the same as the median of his
previous grades regardless of which course he takes).
19. Thirty to thirty-five observations is a typical Iule of thumb used in statistics to distinguish
between large and small samples. But the number of degrees of freedom and the nature of
the sample are important too.
20. A 1996 survey done by Downs and Levit found only two law schools that constrain a teacher's
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point before the class size diminishes to a single student, the costs of forcing a
prescribed spread outweigh the benefits. Because small numbers of persons
behave less predictably, a school's grading constraints might properly allow
greater variation in the average grade in small classes. Over time, however, any
given teacher's mean in such classes ought to fluctuate around the school
average and not be biased in one direction or the other.
It should go without saying that there is no harm in dividing courses into
groups and applying a different mean to each group. A faculty may wish to
take some courses off the curve entirely, allowing all A's in writing courses for
example. Care should be taken, however, to make sure that grading is consis-
tent within each group of courses and that all students take the same number
of hours in any group of courses. Moreover, if the means in upper-level
courses are pegged to previous performances of the students, such means
should probably be calculated without including the courses graded on any
alternative scale to avoid creating an incentive for students to take extra third-
year courses, or to take them out of order.
B. Equalize Standard Deviations
1. Equalize standard deviations across courses.211
Teachers should spread their grades to the same degree in all classes. One
measure of variability in grades, as in any other set of numbers, is the range. 1
This is not a very useful measure, however, because it is based entirely on the
top and bottom scores and ignores all the scores in between. A better measure
of the variation is the standard deviation, which is essentially a measure of how
far the grades fall away from the mean . Since that is generally the best
measure of variation if the means have been equalized, 2: to say that each
teacher's grades should have the same degree of spread is to say that they
should have the same standard deviation.
standard deviation. Robert C. Downs & Nancy Lcvit, If It Can't Be Lake Woebegone . .. A
Nationwide Survey of Law School Grading and Grading Normalization Practices, 65 UMKC
L.. Rev. 819, 837 (1997).
21. "The range ofa set of data is the largest value minus the smallest." It ignores the dispersion of
the values between the two extremes.John E. Freund & Gal y A. Simon, Moden Elementary
Statistics, 8th ed., 7"-74 (1992).
22. The population standard deviation, 1, is the square loot of the qlotient of the sum of the
squares of the differences of the scores frtom the mean score divided by the number of scores.
This is sometimes also called the root-niean-square deviation. Id. at 75. The sample standatd
deviation, s, is calculated in the same fashion except tlhat the divisor is n-i instead of n. The
sample standard deviation is used when estimating a I)opUlation fr'om one or mote samples.
The two statistics get closet as the size of the class increases. Although the two are not much
rlifferent, it is interesting to think about which is theoretically better to use in the context of
grading a class. Since we ate not tlying to estimate (he actual standard deviation frot a
sample, but rather trying to equalize tile spread of glades across different populations, the
population standard deviation wouCid seem al fitrst blush more appropriate.
23. "The standard deviation is by far Ihe most generally useful Ineasur e of v'atiation." Id. at 74.
Another statistic that could be used is the mean deviation, which is the average of the
absolute Values of tihe differences of the scores from the imean. The problem with this
intuitive statistic is that the absolute values in its calculation lead to serious theoretical
difficulties in problems of inference. lM. at 75.
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To see the unfairness that can result when two teachers give grades with
different standard deviations, consider the following example. Bert and Ernie
are among thirty students, all of whom take two courses, Property and Torts.
Ernie gets a 70 in Property and an 80 in Torts. Bert gets just the opposite, an
80 inl Property and a 70 in Torts. Points are equally hard to earn in the two
courses, and the number of exams is the same. The other students are the
same students in both classes, and they perform exactly the same in both
classes, so that the means and standard deviations on the exams are the same;
70 is the mean score and 80 is one standard deviation above the mean.
Conforming to the first principle above, both teachers assign B's to students
who achieve the mean score of 70. But the two teachers do not equalize the
spread of their grades. The Torts teacher increases the grade by one notch (B
to B+, etc.) for each one-half standard deviation above the mean. Ernie scores
his good grade in that class, so he gets an A-. The Property teacher spreads
grades less broadly, increasing a grade by one notch for each full standard
deviation. Bert's good grade is in that class, so he gets a B+. When the two
grades are averaged for the GPA, Bert's GPA will be 3.15, and Ernie's will be
3.30.4 The same total performance results in different grades and quite
different GPAs. Although this example involves a numerical scale, the same
principles apply if the grading is by the gestalt or any other method. A similar
example could be constructed to show that meaningfully different perfor-
mances can result in the same grade.
In addition to this horizontal inequity of like performances receiving
unlike grades, notice that the teacher who gives a wider spread has a greater
impact on the GPAs of the students. A teacher giving grades with a large
standard deviation puts more students into a position to receive special
honors (or dishonors) than a teacher who does not spread scores so widely.
Conversely, a teacher who grades with a smaller variance gives fewer students a
chance at honors. Unless a faculty wants to allow some self-selected teachers to
award more of the accolades and push more students to the bottom of the
class, the faculty should set a standard deviation for all ordinary classes. Of
course faculties willing to so constrain their grading must find a way to make it
easy tor teachers to know the standard deviation of the grades they give, but
software is available for that purpose.
Grades with unequal variation also create bad incentives for students choos-
ing their electives. A student who generally does well will choose courses in
which the spread is wide, if she knows enough to do so, because there are a lot
more A's to be had than in courses in which most grades are bunched around
the mean.21 On the other hand, a student who generally struggles has an
incentive to choose courses with little variation because those courses make it
easier to get an average grade, or close to it. Another incentive problem,
24. A real student's GPA is always constructed from more than two grades; I chose this example
to keep the math simple.
25. This assumes that the courses have the same mean grade.
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suggested above, is that students taking courses with different grade variances
would focus their study efforts on the classes with the larger variances.2 '
One objection to equalizing standard deviations might be that, as a practi-
cal matter, it is just not important enough to be worth the costs of doing so.
On the one hand, the costs borne by teachers are not high because inexpen-
sive grading software makes the task a snap. But what about the other hand,
the costs of unconstrained variance? To determine whether forcing teachers
to give grades with equal means and standard deviations would make any
actual difference to students, Paul Wangerin studied one law school's grades
over eight years. Fie found that such a requirement would have made a
difference of up to 40 places in the class rank of some students. In addition,
three persons who were not ranked number one in their classes would have
been the top students if the teachers had equalized their grading. 7 Those
inequities seem large in light of the ease with which standard deviations can
be equalized.
The arguments above support a rule that requires all teachers to give
grades with the same standard deviation, and it is certainly possible for
teachers to come close to a prescribed standard deviation in all classes of
reasonable size, whatever the spread of actual performances. But there is a
problemn with mapping narrowly bunched performances onto widely spread
grades. If the students' performances appear to be about the same to the
teacher, she will have little confidence that she has ranked the students in the
proper order. If the ranking is wrong to start, magnifying the differences to
reach a mandatory standard deviation will increase the unfairness and ineffi-
ciency of the grading.
Observed student performances might be closely bunched for a number of
reasons. It is possible that the actual student performances in a certain course
(1o not spread as widely as in the usual class. We can never know this is true, but
it will be true in some cases. At this point, we must again acknowledge that
forcing teachers to conform to a prescribed statistic can have the effect of
increasing miscommunication. Because small groups are less predictable, a
school's grading constraints might properly allow greater variation in the
standard deviation for small classes..2 ' As with means, however, any given
teacher's standard leviation in small classes ought to flucttuate over time
around the school's average standard deviation and not be biased in one
direction.
26. One might ask how students will find out that there is i1ore variatiionl il tihe grades of sonic
teachers. That is easy to (to if grades are posted. Students can get a rough leasurte of the
valriation hy sim ply counting the A's. Even when grades are not posted, students can comlpare
notes aId filld (tat thl el e Were a! lot roil A's ill soie coolrses than ill others. I knew that
Iny iLx teache" awarded A's to ollV till'C SltderKi ill 0111- class of aiott 250. Sonc stuidenits ill
the tfllowing classes also knew that eCffort counted t(1" little ill thai cootrse. Those students
who were riot aware of, the pointlessness of elffot ill that class miay have been airbitrarily
penalized iin their gr ades in other Courses otl which they spent relatively little time.
27. Waiget in, suprl note 9, at 114.
28. Once again, there is nothing wroiiig with dividing conurses into grouIps arid nnanidairig
different standard deviations ilot- each group as long as ill students take the same number ol+
credit hours of courses fr1o1)1 each group.
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Student performances can also appear to be tightly bunched if the evalua-
tion instrument is poorly designed. If all multiple-choice questions are either
very easy or very hard, students will tend to have the same scores because all
students can correctly answer all the easy questions but no students can
correctly answer the hard ones. Or, on an single-essay exam, the question
might not elicit much of a range of responses from the students, all seeing the
obvious points and few perceiving the subtleties. These situations present a
real problem. Standard deviations should be equalized but, on the other
hand, with no differences on the exam the teacher has no reliable basis for
making distinctions. What should be done when a teacher's evaluation instru-
ment yields little in the way of meaningful information? Should he be allowed
to deviate below the prescribed standard deviation, effectively devaluing his
grades and the importance of his course, perhaps if he is willing to write a
letter to the administration explaining the deviation from the norm? If stu-
dents were randomly assigned to his course, or if they elected to take the
course without a warning that it would be graded differently, his written
explanation will do little to compensate for the unfairness of their reduced
opportunities for high grades. Only if the students choose the course after
notice that it will have a lower variance is it fair to allow the teacher to give
them less chance at receiving grades that would help them to achieve honors.
When a teacher administers a poor test, he creates problems that are not
easily solved.
A more defensible reason for allowing teachers to deviate from a pre-
scribed standard deviation is that some courses for some reason appeal only to
a narrow range of students-the top, bottom, or middle students. As I sug-
gested with means, an exception might be made when the teacher knows that
the GPAs of the students enrolled have a smaller standard deviation than the
GPAs in similar courses.
Some teachers might feel that their grades deserve more weight because
their tests spread students more widely than the average test. While it is
certainly true that some tests are more reliable instruments of assessment than
others, this argument conflates the scoring of exams with the scaling of the
scores. Scoring is, for good graders, not arbitrary. Good exams garner high
scores and lesser papers draw lower scores. But scaling is arbitrary. With the
exception of teachers, if any, who actually apply absolute standards,"' all
grading involves mapping raw scores (or even impressions, for those who do
not use numbers) onto a grading scale. Suppose that one teacher's test yields
three scores, 33, 30, and 27, while another teacher's test yields 18, 15, and 12.
The latter test did spread scores more broadly in a percentage sense, but the
scores on both tests have to be scaled, and the standard deviation of the
29. One example of an absolute standard is the old-flashioned standard of "good," which was
sometimes equated with a B, which was equal to a 3.0. This assumes, of course, that we know
what "good" nealls. Of course one could argue that even the standard of "good" is relative
rather than absolute. But such an argument only cuts in favor of the point made here, namely
thai grading is often, if not always, comparative, and therefore whether we map test scores
onto higher or lower, or broader or narrower, points on our grading scale is in tiany ways
arbitraty.
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resulting scaled scores on most grading scales will be lower than that of either
testi ° What is the right amount of reduction in the standard deviation? There
is no right answer. It is completely arbitrary. Moreover, there is no reason to
believe that the latter test is in some way a more reliable instrument. It is
possible, for example, that the former test could be turned into the latter test
by subtracting the right fifteen questions. While those fifteen questions might
be doing nothing to add to the power of the test to discriminate between
students, those questions are not harming the discrimination either and they
do gather evidence about the knowledge of the students. Hence, the greater
percentage spread in the actual scores provides no basis for concluding that
one test deserves more weight.
30. The sample standard deviation, s, of the scores on the two tesLs is 3. (The popuIlationl
standard deviation, Y, is 2.45.) The standard deviation of grades in most law courses at
Indiana is less than .5. To fit our scale, the test scores would have to he squeezed clown by
aboUti a factor of 6 (or 5).
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To probe the claims just made, I selected fifty-one problems from my 2002
Property exam and called those problems Test A. I selected a different fifty-
one problems from the same exam and called it Test B. Then I rescored all of
the students on the two exams. The average grade on Test A was 35.1 and on
Test B was 31.6. The standard deviation on Test A was 3.5, but on Test B was
8.8! The figure shows a graphic depiction of the different distributions of
scores on the tests."'
A teacher might look at the much larger standard deviation on Test B and
say that the students who took Test B should have their grades spread more
widely than the students who took Test A. But these are the same students
tested on nearly the same material at the same time!" It is highly unlikely that
the variance in their aptitude or effort was different and, whatever the differ-
ence in spread due to the difference in the substance of the questions, it
stretches credulity to think that the students deserve a substantially different
spread of grades on the two tests.
The general point here is that what appears to be a wide spread of scores on
an exam provides no basis for spreading grades more widely than normal. It is
entirely possible that the wide spread is purely an artifact of the test or scoring
procedure and not a real difference in the underlying levels of aptitude or
learning. Unless there is external evidence comparing the students in one
class to the students in another class, the spread should be the same. The
results of a test given only to one class, standing alone, provide absolutely no
basis for spreading grades more, or less, broadly than average.
Suppose Professor Puffedup is particularly proud of his course and argues
that his grades should have more impact because his course is harder than
others and imparts more learning than other courses of the same credit. We,
Puffedup's colleagues, cannot deny that some four-hour course has the great-
est content, however defined, and Puffedup insists that his course is that
course. Puffedup's argument loses some force, however, when we recognize
that he is essentially rehashing a point that the faculty has already decided, a
point. that was settled when the faculty gave his course (and others) four hours
of credit toward graduation and four hours of weight in the GPA. Given that
truce, the issue is whether the school should allow Professor Puffedup to
unilaterally say, "My course counts for more." My guess is that most faculties
would deny him that authority. Moreover, even if we agree with Professor
Puffedup that his course is worth more and therefore do not mind that he
gives his grades more clout, we should still be bothered by the fact that his
deviation makes it possible for equal total performances by two students to
result in unequal class ranks.
Another claim that I have heard a teacher make is that he writes and grades
exams more reliably than the average teacher, and therefore it is not a
31. The scores along the horizontal axis increase by one point for each hash mark. The bar on
the left of each figure represents no data and should be ignored. It was added to equalize the
scale of the two figures.
32. The material tot both tests was taken from all parts of the original exam. But since the
correlation coefficieni for the two tests was only .48, it is clear that the two tests did cover
diffeent material or skills.
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problem that his grades count more heavily when grades are summed into
GPAs. It is true that some teachers' grades are probably more reliable than
others', but which teachers? Once again, we confr-ont a problem of proof.
Unless a teacher can convince his colleagues that he is better at assessing
performance, he should be constrained by the same limit on grade variation
as constrains his colleagues." He might argue that neither he nor any other
teacher need be constrained; others are free to increase their spread if they
want their grades to have weight equal to his. The defect in his argument is
that responsible graders might not have the freedom he feels. Teachers who
believe that grades should be proportional (discussed below) and believe that
they should not give failing grades to students with passing performance may
not be able to expand their grades enough to equal the variation of the
teacher who does not feel constrained by those two principles.
A more egalitarian variant of the argument above proceeds from the
premise that teachers vary in their grading acuity fiom year to year. One year's
exam generates responses that allow the teacher to feel very confident in her
grades. The next year's exam in that same course generates like responses
from all students in the class, leaving her with no confidence that she has
reliably detected the variation that actually existed in the class. To take
account of this varying reliability, we could allow teachers to vary their stan-
dard deviation from the target in any given year as long as they hit the target,
on the average, in a given period of years. Grades in which teachers had more
confidence would get more weight in the average, while grades in which
teachers had less confidence would acquire less weight. This should make the
GPA a better predictor or measure of overall student performance.
This approach would raise serious issues, beyond the obvious but sur-
mountable administrative difficulties. As I pointed out above, diminishing the
weight placed on the grades in one course could be viewed as unfair to
students who did well in that course and unfair to the students who did poorly
in another course. The deeper unfairness, that of treating equals differently,
does not arise here because the premise of varying exam quality denies the
equality of performances that was presumed above. But unless the course was
an elective and there was notice that it would have a lower variance, it might
still seem unfair for one course to have an unusually large or small impact on
students' grade point averages. Since a system that allowed teachers to vary
around a target standard deviation would prevent teachers from grabbing" t
more weight for their classes and since it could be more accurate, we face
something of a tradeoff between accuracy and fairness. The unfairness here
might be eliminated by telling the students in advance that courses will be
weighted according to both the course credit hours and the quality of the
33. An interlesIing issue is presenied when al teachmer Can pr ode good evidence that her exam is
more reliable than average. In such cases should the school give that ieacher's grades more
weight? Doing so woumld increase the atccuracy of studenti GPAs, but it would cr'eaie incentive
problems if it were known to the siudenis and f;li ness problems ifit were not known.
34. Such a system would also prevent a leacher l'om noimintelionally giving Ier coutse m01e
weight in the lotal.
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exams as determined ex post by the teachers." A student in the ex ante
position could rationally prefer the more accurate but less predictable system,
and in that sense it could qualify as fair. It also seems likely that employers
would prefer that system. But the students would probably feel something like
the caged rat that never knows when he is going to suffer his next electric
shock. My guess is that reducing the predictability would generate more
anxiety than the increase in accuracy was worth.
So the standard deviation should be equalized across classes. But we can
justify limited exceptions to allow leeway for small classes, to account for
differences in prior performances of the students, and to minimize the impact
of poor evaluation instruments if students are properly warned of that possi-
bility in advance.
2. Be careful when forcing grades to a curve.
The argument made here for standardization should not be read as an
argument for normalization. Some schools attempt to solve the problem of
unequal spreads across courses by mandating that certain percentages of the
class fall into each of the available grade intervals. If the percentage ranges for
each interval are very narrow, the forced curves will have the salutary effect of
keeping all teachers to the same mean and standard deviation. The forced
curve has the added benefit of avoiding differences in skewness and other
statistics that are used to describe distributions.' Nevertheless, there are a
numiber of potential problems with specifying the precise percentages of
grades to be awarded in each of the grading intervals.
The first problem is that the mandated curve is often based on a normal
distribution, and the students in a school might not actually be normally
distributed about the mean in their combined aptitude and effort. In fact
there are good reasons to believe they are not normally distributed. Assuming
that legal ability is normally distributed in the population, it is likely that for
the most part only the top portion of the population is admitted to law school;
the law schools may make up a collective Lake Wobegon in the sense that all
students are above average. So the distribution of students might look some-
thing like the upper half of a bell curve, but in any case it seems doubtful that
it is normal. If all of those students were to be divided equally, each school's
curve would be expected to be nonnormal, perhaps something like the right
hall of a bell curve.
35. If all teachers go high or all teachers go low on the standard deviation, allowing that freedom
has not really harmed the process. If sonie go high and some go low one year, the opposite
will be true another year, and in both yeats the ttore accurate exams will get more weight.
11ut that will make comparisons across classes more difficult.
36. Roughly speaking, a distihution is skew when the tail on one end is longer than the tail on
the other en Or, om e acco l'ately, when it is not symmetrical about the mean. The Pearsonian
coefficient of skewness is calculated by suhtracting the median front the mean, multiplying by
3, and dividing by the standard deviation. There are other statistics designed to describe
distibutions, and they could also be equalized across classes (and would be equalized with a
forced culrve), hut trying to equalize them might not he worth the effort, although I know
one teacher who has done so.
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Second, applications and admissions differ across schools. Starting with a
group of mostly above-average students, some schools' admissions processes
cut off the lower end of the distribution fairly abruptly, ruling out the poorly
credentialed students and admitting many students just above the cutoff. Of
those students that barely made it, many will choose to attend because they
will have few options that are better; they will not qualify for admission to
more selective schools. At the top end of the admitted students, the percent-
age that matriculate will be low because those students have many options.
The top of the distribution is thinned out in the fierce competition with other
schools in a way that the bottom of the distribution is not, exacerbating the
skewness of the underlying population.
In short, at many schools a disproportional number of the students admit-
ted will be at the lower end of the school's range, and among those admitted a
disproportional number at the lower end will accept admission." Of course
admissions policies vary across schools, and the distributions of students will
vary accordingly. The point here is not to try to predict what the distribution
of abilities will look like at all schools, but rather to point out that there are
good reasons to expect that the students will not be normally distributed in
their combination of aptitude and effort. A group of nonnormal scores can be
mapped onto a normal curve only with a nonlinear transformation," the
problems of which are discussed below. For those reasons, it could well
increase miscommunication for a school to require all courses to have the
same number of A's as C's, or have grades that are symmetric about the
median or mean, or have tails as long as those in the normal curve, or
otherwise conform to any single predetermined distribution.
A school could account for the preceding deviations from normality by
determining a local curve based on its own students. It could "grade" its
students on the basis of their intake statistics (usually the undergraduate GPA
and LSAT score) and use the resulting distribution as the template or curve to
be applied in each course. 9 But there are still other reasons to worry about
whether the students in any particular course will be a representative sample
of the whole school. One reason we might not see a school-typical distribution
is that some students might not have prepared at all, making their perfor-
mance much worse than those ranked just above them. Another reason the
performances might fit the school's curve is, as mentioned above, that
a particular course might attract a special group of students, either above
or below the mean or perhaps less widely distributed than the usual class in
that school.
37. Thus, although law student as ai group arc above the average of the entire national
population, the majority of the stidents at any one school may be below average fot that
school.
38. A teacher at one school with a forced curve reports that it sometimes prevents hii front
maintaining proportionality in his grading. By contrast, ttmeans attd standard deviations can
always be equalized with a linear iransf rnation.
39. One problem with this approach is that the JGPA and ILSAT scor-e, even combined, do not
predict grades reliably enough.
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These last problems could be partially mitigated in upper-level courses by
tuning the class distribution to the actual performance of the students in
previous course work, a curve based on the actual GPAs of the students in the
class. But this is not a solution either. If the mandate is highly specific, it could
force teachers to give students inappropriate grades. It is likely that a curve
requiring "2 to 3 percent grades of D" will force a teacher to give more or
fewer D grades than the class actually deserves."' There will be test-to-test
variations in the performances of the students that cannot be accommodated
by any precise grading curve. Of course the same concern could also be used
to argue against a mandatory mean or standard deviation, but the point does
not apply with equal force in that larger context. The possibility that the
relative student performances do not conform to predictions is greater when
the numbers are smaller.) For a class of two students, any mandate, whether
mean, standard deviation, or curve, is dangerous. For a class of 500, all three
can be mandated without a problem because there will be a large number of
students in each interval." For a class of thirty students, however, forcing the
scores onto a curve will be troublesome because some of the intervals will
contain very few students. For classes of the size that are common in law
schools and for grading scales with more than a few intervals, forcing a specific
percentage of students into each interval is riskier than mandating a standard
deviation because each of the intervals involves only a portion of the class,
whereas the standard deviation relates to the whole class. With the whole class,
small variations will average out in a way that is not likely when an interval
includes only a few students.
Some schools have accounted for this problem by loosening the mandate,
allowing teachers some latitude in the percentages of grades falling into each
interval. While that solves the small-number problem, it recreates the original
problem of variation in grading across classes. When all the small deviations in
each grading interval are added up, the results may be substantial variation in
the means or standard deviations from teacher to teacher.43 The flexibility
needed to account for irregularities in the actual distributions of perfor-
mances allows too much variation in the mean or spread of the grades. By
contrast, mandating a mean and standard deviation keeps variation in course
importance to a minimum while reducing the specific inequities that arise
when a curve is imposed on a distribution of performances that did not
actually fit that curve. A teacher can reach a specified mean and maximum
standard deviation even when the distribution of scores on her test is bimodal,
40. One of the reasons that this is a problem is explained in the section below on proportionality.
41. The small-numbers problem is a function of the number of the grading intervals and the
nunbet of students because the total number of students will be divided by the number of
intervals. For reasons discussed below, intervals should be numerous. But the more numer-
ous the interals, the more a forced distribution is problematic.
42. Mike Alexeev pointed this out. I admit I am not accustomed to thinking about such large
classes.
43. Some schools fix this problem by constraining the mean and standard deviation as well as the
distribution. See Downs & Levit, supra note 20, at 838. But those schools may run into the
small-numbers problem if they attempt to fetter the distribution too tightly.
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single tailed, or otherwise out of step with the school or the previous perfor-
mances of the students in that class.
Despite the points above, it would be rational to take the position that a
school needs a mandatory distribution to counteract the effects of bad exami-
nations. Suppose a bad exam has artificially created a bimodal distribution. If
the exam preserved ordinality, although it lost cardinality, a forced curve can
put the students back where they belong in relation to each other. If the
forced curve is based on the predictors of performance for the actual students
in the class, and some freedom is given to account for variation in small
numbers, the curve might do more good than harm. But if the ctue does
allow leeway, it will not fix the mean and the standard deviation. Therefore,
unless a curve is specified narrowly, it should not be seen as a complete
substitute for a forced mean and standard deviation. If the class is large
enough to apply a curve, it is more than large enough for fixing the mean and
the variance.
3. SchooLv can use standardized grades to rank students.
Some faculties would object that forcing means and standard deviations
upon teachers violates their academic freedom'" or undermines the goals of
criterion-referenced assessment. Other faculties will find other reasons not to
force teachers to conform their grading to predetermined statistics. But even
in such schools, all is not lost. As is suggested by Wangerin's study, the goals
embedded in the first two principles above might be partially accomplished by
a school's administration without forcing teachers to change any of their
grading practices. Rather than calculating actual GPAs, the administration
could calculate a summary performance score (SPS)' t and a class rank in the
same way that many careful teachers calculate grades from multiple compo-
nents, that is to say, using Z-scores or T-scores. In other words, the administra-
tion could turn all teachers' grades into Z- or T-scores and use those for
calculation of the SPS and rank.
What are Z-scores and T-scores? They are scores that have the same means
and standard deviations and are often used to make it easier to compare or
combine scores on different tests or parts of tests. A Z-score is created by
subtracting the mean and then dividing by the standard deviation (Z-score =
(obserwed score - average score) / standard deviation)." Tile mean of a set of
Z-scores is 0, and the standard deviation is 1. Z-scores are scores for which the
means and standard deviations have thus been equalized.
Because about one-half of the Z-scores are negative, some teachers prefer
to use T-scores. T-scores can be derived from Z-scores by multiplying each
score by 10 and then adding 50 (T-score = Z-score x 10 + 50). The resulting set
ot scores has a mean of 50 and standard deviation of' 10. It makes no math-
ematical difference whether an administration combines grades using the Z-
44. Scc id. at 848-52.
45. To avoid confusion with thc GPA, this SPS shotild be im an obviously different scale from the
grades.
46. For additional discussion of Z-scores, see Watgerin, supra note 9, i 102.
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or T-score method. Both have "standardized" the component parts of the
overall performance score according to the standard deviation of the grades
in the courses, and both give equal weight to all courses.
Once it has created Z-scores or T-scores out of the grades in the courses, the
administration can multiply those scores by the number of credit hours in the
courses to give each grade appropriate weight. After that, the products can be
summed or averaged to yield a single overall performance score. The adminis-
tration would thus treat each teacher's grades as one test in a series of exams
being given the students. The final scores could then be used to determine
class rank.
There are actually a couple of advantages to accomplishing this equaliza-
tion administratively. An individual teacher of a small class graded with a
coarse grading system may have a hard time conforming her grades to a
prescribed mean or standard deviation. If her average is too low, for example,
moving only a couple of'students with the same score to a higher grade might
make her average too high. The administrative approach allows her to give
whatever grades she feels appropriate and does not require her to do any
mathematical or other adjustments. The administration does the mathemati-
cal manipulation for her and, for purposes of determining class ranks, can in
effect award students grades that do not exist on the grading scale in order to
make her grades comparable to grades from other teachers. The other advan-
tage for faculties uncomfortable with grading mandates is that teachers are
not forced to grade according to a curve. They can assign grades on whatever
basis they choose, letting the administration attempt to make the grades
compatible when summing them up.
This approach will not work in all situations, however. To take a simple-
albeit extreme-example, if a teacher gives only one grade, there is no fair way
for the administration to give a set of scores that varies as required to meet the
expected standard deviation. In less extreme cases where teachers have given
mostly one grade with only a few grades higher or lower, it is perhaps
improper for the administration to spread them more widely.47
Another way for the administration to reduce grading disparities is to do
the scaling for the teachers. At my school, the administration offers to take raw
scores from teachers and combine them using the weights for those scores
that the teacher provides. Because the teacher retains final control over the
mean and standard deviation, this approach is less intrusive, and less effective,
than administrative rescaling of all the grades recorded by the teachers.
Nonetheless, the process can help keep teachers from deviating too far from
the practices of other teachers by suggesting a reasonable set of grades.
Assuming an administration does use Z-scores for combining grades, is
there any reason for individual teachers to equalize means and deviations? A
couple of reasons remain. One is that students might compare grades and be
47. As discussed above, an assessment that results in almost all scores being the same can raise
problems that are not easily solved. When a school intends to include a cour-se in GPAs and
class ranks, the teacher should be encoutraged to assess performance in ways that yield
meaningfil differences.
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misled if the actual means and deviations have not been standardized across
courses. Similarly, some employers might compare two students' grades (per-
haps students from different years so that class rank is not helpful) and get the
impression that one is a better student when the truth is the other way around.
To cure this, the administration might rescale all scores and report those
rescaled scores on the transcript. The faculty might object, however, that
grades should be given by teachers, not the administration. Nonetheless, if the
administration were to calculate the SPS and the rank by using Z-scores, the
need for teachers to submit grades with uniform means and standard devia-
tions would be substantially diminished.
4. Teachers should use standardized scores when combining components of a course
grade.
Even if the administration uses standardized scores to combine grades from
different courses, it is still important for teachers to follow the principle of
equalizing standard deviations if they create composite grades from subscores.
Most teachers grade on the basis of more than one question or set of ques-
tions." Some teachers do not try to accord their scores different weights, they
just add them up. Other teachers go to some trouble to give different weights
to different parts. Many teachers do not give students a clear indication of the
relative weight that will be placed on the various components that make up
the final grade. The upside to that omission is that the teacher is not sending
false signals no matter how he combines the scores. Another advantage is that
the teacher learns more about what the students know without studying. The
downside is that the teacher learns less about what the students could know if
they had a chance to study.
Although I specify the weight for each set of questions on my exams, I do
not take the position that all teachers should do so. If a teacher does make
representations regarding the process of calculating final grades, she should
live up to them. She should do so for simple reasons of honesty, of course. But
that is not the only reason. Once again, the inefficiency and unfairness of
miscommunication are implicated. Take an example from outside of law
teaching. Professor Athlete teaches a clinical course on track and field. He
announces that 95 percent of the final grade will be the student's time in a
100-meter dash. The other 5 percent will be his height in a pole vault. Then,
when he grades, Athlete gives 5 percent of the weight to the dash and 95
percent to the pole Vault. Sensible students will have spent most of their time
practicing the dash. As a result, the pole vault scores will not be a very reliable
indicator of the students' abilities to do the pole Vault, much less their overall
athletic abilities. While some students might never have improved, some
might have been able to do much better if they had allocated practice time to
pole vaulting. The scores on the 100-meter dash will be much more reliable,
but they are given so little weight in the final grade that those grades end up
being mostly a report of the unreliable information gained in the pole Vaults.
48. Teachers who do not combine subscores into some lformi of total score can skip ahead to the
next section, III C.
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Thus the grades are not good indicators of track and field ability. Certainly, if
a coach were trying to choose a good team on the basis of grades, she would
prefer that Professor Athlete weight the scores as he had said he would.
Returning to the typical law school course, the more the teacher misleads a
student about what will be on the exam, the less she will study the material
tested and the less reliable the test will be as a measure of the student's ability
to learn. The more the teacher misleads a student about the weight that will be
given each portion of the exam, the greater the possibility that she will receive
a low score because she spent too much time on one problem-not because
she could not have answered the other problems well. Teachers should assign
grades as promised.
Many teachers tell the students in advance how much weight each question
will receive in the final accounting. ' Sometimes they succeed. But other times
they end tp giving more or less weight than they and the students thought
would be accorded that portion of their assessment. The key to getting weights
right is paying attention to the degree of variation in the scores on each
component of the total. Failure to account for variability of these scores can
undermine the best intentions to weight carefully and provide accurate infor-
mation to the students about the basis of assessment.
To see how such a failure could occur, take an example. Suppose the
course grade is to be made from two subscores, each having equal weight.
Each part of the exam has a total possible score of 100. On part A, the scores
are normally distributed from 55 to 65. On part B, the scores are normally
distributed fiom 20 to 40. Having taken statistics, the teacher remembers that
he cannot simply add the two scores together because the students obviously
performed differently on the two parts. To live up to his promise of equal
weight, he multiplies the scores on part B by 2 so that the average on part B is
equal to the average on part A. This is a huge mistake because the scores on
part B now run from 40 to 80. When the final grades are given, most of the
students in the class will receive the same grade they would have received if
part B had been the only assessment instrument and part A had not been
counted at all. If you doubt this,just imagine that the scores on part A had run
friom 59 to 61 with an average of 60. Will part A have as much impact as part B
now? The effect of the teacher's method was to further devalue the scores that
were already devalued by the process used for scoring the two parts. That is
neither what the teacher wanted nor what the students expected.
49. In this discussion I do not mean to prejudge the question of what is promised. A teacher
coulrl say that 10 percent of the points on the exam will be on section A. If she gives 10
possible points for section A and 90 points for section B, she has fulfilled her promise, even if
all students get all 10 points. On the other hand, if she says that 10 percent of the variance in
the grades will come from the dilference in petlortnances on section A, she cannot fulfill her
promise if all students get all 10 points. When a teacher says that "section A will be given 10
percent of the weight," it is not clear which she means, points or variance, but I will assume
the latter meaning. I take no stand on what teachers should promise, but whichever is
intended, the teacher ought to make the intention clear to students, or at least try to leave all
students with the same understanding. I also take no position on what a teacher should do
when she has written an exam that makes it impossible for her to live ttp to her promise, but
I acknowledge that giving large weight to minute differences in performance is fraught with
potential for unfairness and inefficiency.
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Readers who have slogged through the preceding discussion of standardiz-
ing the spread across various courses will recognize that tie solution is to
equalize the variation in the scores in those parts. If the amount of variation
can be made the same, the parts will have equal weight in the final summation.
The teacher should linearly manipulate the scores so that the scores in each
subpart have the same standard deviation. This is a simple matter of' dividing
each score by the standard deviation for the scores in that part. 'P After that
division, the scores oil each subpart will have a standard deviation equal to 1,
and therefore will be equally spread out and consequently will have equal
weight." Of course, standardized scores indicate only a student's relative
performance in the class. If there is some absoltte level of performance that
can be identified in advance as being important for some reason, that level
must be attended to using the raw, unstandardized scores, or that level has to
be standardized using the same linear transformations before the standard-
ized scores are compared to it. By equalizing the variance in their subscores
before combining them, teachers can prodlIce grades in a way that conforms
to the expectations created by their syllabi and announcements.
C. Use Smaller and More Numerous Grade Intervals
One of the common misconceptions about grading is that it is better to use
a coarse grading scale with fewer and larger groupings because the grader can
have more confidence in the grades. Clearly it is true that no one will get the
wrong grade if one grade is given to all students. Likewise, teachers probably
make few errors when they have to determine only whether the students pass
or fail. Generally a teacher will make fewer errors if she uses fewer grades than
she will if she tries to make finer distinctions. But that is only half of the story,
and in my view the less important hall'. There is a tradeoff between, on one
side, the frequency of errors and, on the other side, both the precision of
information recorded for subsequent retrieval and the magnitude of the
errors in that information.
To take a simple case, suppose that grades in one class are based on a single
test, the class's scores range between 5 and 13, the standard deviation in the
scores is 3, and the standard error for the test is 1 .' That standard error means
50. I subtract the mean before dividiig, thus tlinriig the raw scores into Z-scorcs. One of' nay
colleagues refuses Io uSC Z-scnres oin lic grounids hitl CCll ihis simple tI lisl'orilintiol
diiinishcs iralisparlcicy in grading, making it harde linr sttdciits to uinderstand their griades
and foi- hin Io check the resttuIN lotl arithinletic rirorts. TI isprti CIIcy is valtable, but I think it
would be beier for sthools to achieve it )v explaining the tiiatsfoiinatioii to the stiidelias, As
or math I irrlrs, good collplter software should lll iakc ally, but I adnmit that the Z-sciolC
iitllihod dfoes itiakC it somewhalt hitrdcl to catch it coi)lliptile S Cirr)lS. I allow lily stuidteits to
see both tie raw and Z-scorCs so tiat they can check ie final resultis to see if they nmake selsc.
51. Fortunately there is conputer sofiwaire available for iiaking all of lhesc calculatio is. All a
teacher has to do is fill it lth scores o lhi subparls, supply 11thc weights l'ol"a Iic siihpairt, and
supply the i slittllioll's gradiIIg scale. The sofltwair will do (lie Iest. If lhe class is ino imuo small
and the exari does a decCeil jot of idcililing dillerences between studenLs, the restilting
grades will be weighted approprialely, will ha v the desired ican nitd staiwlard deviationi,
and will be propol t tiu l to the itistittithot's gradiig scale.
52. Real exams usually have more points and larger siaridard erors, but the sane l)riciples
apply. For it real exatuple, see if'a, page 608.
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that the teacher can be somewhat confident that the test has not mismeasured
each student's true score (real learning or ability) by more than 1 point. In
other words, the student who scored 6 might more accurately be described
with 5 or 7, but it is unlikely he deserved 4 or 8. If this teacher's school allows
her to give grades from C- to A+ and she maps each of her students' scores of
5 through 13 onto those nine letter grades, she and the school cannot have
much confidence that any of those grades is correct: a number of them will be
wrong. The school can reduce the number of inappropriate grades by limiting
the grading scale to three grades, A, B, and C, where 5-7 = C, 8-10 = B, and
11-13 = A. The students who scored 6, 9, or 12 probably get the right grade,
and students who scored 7, 8, 10, or 11 are only half as likely to receive the
wrong grade as under the finer grading scale. The coarser scale reduces the
frequency of errors.
Two problems are created when a school reduces the frequency of errors by
imposing a grading scale that is coarser than that used to score the tests or
other measures of performance. First, information is lost in the process of
rounding the scores to the nearest marks on a coarse grading scale. When the
teacher herself looks back at the grade later, she will not know whether a
student she gave a B scored 8, 9, or 10 on the exam. That imprecision in
recording is added to the imprecision of the test itself, with the result that the
teacher can be confident only that the B student had a true learning of
somewhere between 7 through 11. If she had recorded the grade as a B-, she
would know when she looks back later that the student's true score was
probably 7, 8, or 9. Other readers of her grades are certainly in no better
position than she is to interpret her grades. If a school requires teachers to
map detailed information onto a coarser grading scale, the school forces
teachers to throw away information that cannot later be reconstructed by any
reader of the grade."
This problem-that coarse grading scales conceal meaningftl differences-
can also occur when coarse grades are combined into an overall GPA if there
is little variation in the student performance and little measurement error. If
Joan's scores in three courses are 10 and John's three scores are 8, they will
both have a B average even though Joan's performance total of 30 is much
better than Iohn's total of 24. Even if 10 is not significantly different from 8, 30
can be significantly different from 24, but the reader of the transcripts will
never know of the meaningful difference in performance. If, however, the
grading scale allows the teacher to modift, each whole grade with a plus or
minus, the differences in total performance will easily show through.Joan will
have a B+ average and John a B-. So the first point in favor of a scale with finer
gradations is that it allows teachers to record and communicate more informa-
tion than can be contained in a coarser scale.
It is true that this problem diminishes as variation in the student perfor-
mance increases relative to the width of the grade intervals and as the number
of courses being averaged increases. Whether there is enough variation to
53. Of course the teacher can keep finer information if she wants to, but. rcadcrs of transcripts
tSlally do Inot have access tO stich inlfo'rmation.
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allow differences in students to show through the coarse grading scale be-
comes an empirical question. In the first year of law school, where grades
matter most, each student's average is composed of only a few grades. In
schools with few grade intervals, students with differing performance might
have the same GPA, but perhaps that does not happen often enough to
matter. I do know that a coarse grading scale led to fifteen number-one
students in the class of 2002 at my daughter's high school. Like actual student
variation, error in the measurement instruments may also make it easier to
distinguish between students, but that possibility should give us no comfort as
it raises the next-more serious-problem.
The second problem created by coarse grading is that errors are nastier.
Continuing the example from two paragraphs above, some students who
scored 7 had a true score of 8. They should have gotten a B instead of a C. By
giving a C, the teacher has said that these students are well below average
when she should have said they are average. Conversely, some students who
scored 8 had a true score of 7. They should have gotten a C instead of a B.
Under the coarse system the errors in grading are large, a full grade. Under
the finer scale the errors are more frequent but much smaller; there is little
chance that any student's grade is off by a full standard deviation.
An actual example can be constructed from the Property test I gave to
ninety-four students in the spring of 2002. The standard error for the exam
was about 5, and the scores ran from the 60s up into the 130s, with a mean of
96.4. 51 Suppose I divide the scores into three intervals: C's below 82, B's from
82 to Ill, and A's above 111. Looking at the students' actual scores, I would
have sixteen persons within one standard error of the A-B border and seven-
teen students within about one standard error of the B-C border, for a total of
thirty-three students for whom there is a 16 percent or greater chance of being
wrong. And, importantly, for those thirty-three students whose grades might
easily be wrong, the error is large, one whole point on our 4.0 grading scale.
For those wrongly graded students, the grade I would give says that they are a
full standard deviation above or below average when they are not, or says that
they are average when they are well above or below it.
Compare that to a system with finer gradations. If I divide up the range of
all scores into fifteen equal subintervals of 5 points, from A+ through F-, all
students are within one standard error of the border above and below their
scores, and therefore I cannot be confident that I have placed any of the
ninety-four students in the correct grade interval. However, if' there is an
error, the error is only one-third as large. Moreover, I am nearly certain that a
student's grade is not in error by a whole grade point (3 standard errors),
whereas errors that large were quite likely with the coarser gradations.
A finer grading scale increases the number of errors but reduces the size of
the errors. Which should we choose in this tradeoff between frequency and
54. The standard error and other statistics are calculated by the scoring service at the Bur eau of
Evaluative Studies and Testing at Indiana University and reported to the teacher for each set
of exams scored. The standard deviation of the scores is 15.4; the Spearman-Brown reliability
of the exam is .91. There is a 68 percent chance that the tine score is within one standard
CIOr of the measuired ScorC.
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magnitude of errors? Both the theory of declining marginal utility of income
and the actual and common sales of insurance suggest that the harm from
putting large losses on a few persons is worse than the harm from placing
small losses on many persons.5 In addition, as a reader of undergraduate
grades for purposes of law school admissions, I would much rather hear that
all applicants' grades are slightly erroneous than hear that some of the
applicants' grades are quite erroneous and others are correct, because the
latter information prevents me from placing any weight on any of the grades.
The information that the grades for every third student could be far off more
deeply undermines confidence in all of the grades than the information that
all are slightly off. For those reasons, reducing the gravity of errors by making
grading intervals smaller and more numerous reduces both the unfairness
and the inefficiency that come with unavoidable miscommunication.
It is true that drawing lines in the gaps can reduce the number of errors
somewhat for either a fine or coarse scale, but doing so creates a different
problem, lack of proportionality, which is discussed below. The better solu-
tion is a finer grading scale. But the adoption of a finer scale should not be
accompanied by a requirement that all teachers use all of the points on the
scale. What level of discrimination in assessment ought to be required of
teachers is a separate issue implicating issues much broader than can be
discussed here. If a teacher wants to givejust six different grades, the adoption
of a finer scale should not be the occasion for forcing her to expend more
effort on grading or to shift to a method of assessment that she feels is
inferior." In fact, if she can see only A's, B's, and C's, when she reads the
papers, it would be counterproductive to force her to randomly append a few
pluses and minuses to those marks.5 7 Conversely, one teacher's unwillingness
to use a finely graduated system should not be sufficient reason for the school
to fail to provide such a scale for those teachers who would find it equitable
and useful for communication.
All of the points above can be accommodated without radically changing
the way any teacher grades. I now turn to a principle that cannot be followed
55. It is my hunch that we should also prefer smaller, more frequent errors in the context of
compiling GPAs. It seems less likely that errors in grading will average out when the errors
are large and infrequent than when they are small and common.
56. A teacher who fails to discriminate between students who are meaningfully different sends
messages that are both unfair and inefficient because she says that students are the same
when they are not. But this is not the place for discussing whether she should change her
method of writing or scoring exams. This article is about the process of turning raw scores
into grades.
57. That is not to say that we should honor the teacher who wishes to rotnd her finer numerical
marks into rough groups on the ground that there is "no meaningful difference" between
two different scores that she has awarded. To take an extreme example, suppose that the
grading scale allows any score from .001 to .999. A teacher might say that there is no
difference between her score of .343 and .344. Sometimes the teacher does not really mean
"no difference"; the chances are greater that the .344 was better than the .343 than vice versa,
however minuscule the difference. But if she says that there was truly no difference at all,
then we should ask why she did not just use .34 for both and drop the random digit. If she also
contends that there is no difference between .34 and .35, and then also between .3 and .4,
then we ask how she can tell the difference between .4 and .5, or between .5 and .6, and so
forth. Unless there is a discontinuity, she cannot tell the difference between the scores of.1
and .9, and should not be allowed to grade.
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unless some teachers are willing to make at least small changes to their
method of grading.
1). Use Proportional Grade Intervals
Grades are proportional, as I use the term here, when there is a linear
mapping from the performance of the students, as assessed by the teacher, to
the grading scale used by the school. For a teacher who uses a gestalt method,
this means that the teacher assigns grades so that there is as much difference
between an A paper and a B paper as there is between a B paper and a C
paper. For a teacher who uses points, this means that the width of each grade
interval is proportional to the difference between the numerical scores her
school gives for the corresponding grades. Suppose a university has a grading
scale in which A=4, B=3, and C=2, and minuses and pluses are .33 away from
the whole grades. In other words, each possible grade in the university system
is the same distance f-om the grades above and below it. A teacher's grading
scale is proportional to the university scale if it is the same number of: points
from one grade to the next. The scale on which 17=A, 15=A-, 13=B+, II =B, is
proportional. By contrast, the scale on which 17=A, 15=A-, 12=B+, 8=B, is not
proportional becautse the distance between the scores does not remain con-
stant as it does in the university system into which the grades will be fed.
1. The Harm from Nonlinear Grading
There are two major ways in which lack of proportionality can lead to
inaccurate communication. First, students with equivalent total performance
can receive different grade point averages, and vice versa. Second, a reader
comparing three students might wrongly infer that the difference in perfor-
mance between an A+ and a A is the same as the difference between a B+ and
B. I explain these two points below and then discuss a few reasons a teacher
might be tempted to ise disproportional grade intervals.
A disproportional grading scale will mislead readers of transcripts who
harbor the reasonable presumption that a higher grade point average means
higher total performance. Suppose all students take Four courses given equal
weight in the school's grading system. Although individual students perform
differently in the courses, the stdents as a group perform essentially the same
across the fotir coturses; all of the exams have the same distribution of raw
scores. Each teacher translates the raw scores onto a nonlinear scale employ-
ing the minimum cutoffs given below:"










58. The leaclers do not ]haVeIo use tile Sai e noi l Iialrscale fCo ieW I esuIhs herein io obtain.
Making the Grade: Some Principles of Comparative Grading
Elba scores 19, 19, 36, 36 on her exams, and Ben scores 24, 24, 24, 24 on his.
Ben deserves a 2.5 average, and he gets it. Elba also gets a 2.5 average, even
though her total performance of 110 is substantially better than Ben's 96.
Despite the fact that the teachers' grades have the same mean and standard
deviation, two students with substantially different overall exam performance
wind up with the same GPA. Of course, a similar error in communication can
occur in any grading scale that rounds many scores onto a few grading points.
But that is a separate problem of coarseness, already discussed. The inaccu-
racy here is not due to rounding because I chose the students' scores to be
exactly in the middle of the various grade intervals. The use of a dispropor-
tional scale creates a communication error of its own in addition to the usual
rounding problem.59 Whlen the relationship between the teacher's raw scores
and the school's scale is not linear, ordinary addition can lead to poor
signaling of comparative performance.
Lack of proportionality may lead to a more troubling outcome: different
GPAs for students who performed the same. Suppose that Mark scores 21 on
his four final exams, for a total of 84 points and a GPA of 2.0. Sara scores 16,
16, 16, and 36, for the same total of 84, but a GPA of only 1.625. Sara's total
performance is the same but her GPA is worse. Except in unusual circum-
stances, we would not give a person who scores 21, 21, 21, and 21 on four
equally weighted parts of a single exam a different grade from a person who
scores 16, 16, 16, and 36. Yet that is just what we do to some students' GPAs
when we fail to maintain proportionality in our grading scales. The inequity
here will probably be exacerbated when the GPAs are converted to class ranks
because that often has the effect of magnifying small differences in GPAs.
In the examples above, a student suffers for being less consistent in her
exam performance. But that is not always the result. Suppose Kim scores 19,
19, 19, and 19 on her exams whilejake scores 21, 21, 21, and 11I " Kim's total
of 76 is better thanJake's 74, but her GPA of 1.5 is worse thanJake's 1.625. We
could also devise a nonlinear scale that would usually penalize consistency or
one that would reward it. Unless a faculty decides that the more consistent
performer should have a higher GPA, or the other way around, the school
should use a scale that does not make consistency a hidden component of
the C PA.
The unfairness of disproportionality in the case of Sara and Mark might be
called horizontal inequity, in that essentially similar students are treated
differently. Another way in which lack of proportionality can lead to unfair-
ness might be called vertical inequity, which can crop up even when grades are
not combined into GPAs and class ranks if a reader of the grades thinks that
the interval scale is linear. Vertical inequity refers to situations in which
different performances are treated either too differently or not differently
enough. In a linear scale, the difference in underlying performance between a
C and a B is the same as the difference in performance between a B and an A.
59. I see no reason to belicve ihat the two errors iend to cancel each other in a way that might
reach a second-best solution; in fact perhaps the opposite occurs.
60. Compare also 21, 21, 16, 16.
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If a B student had scored x more points, she would have received an A; if she
had scored x fewer points, she would have received a C. Under such a system,
the performance deserving an F is as much worse than a C as an A is better. On
a nonlinear scale, xfewer points might push a paper from a B to a D instead of
just down to a C. In addition to unfairness, if grading is not linear, it is very
difficult for a reader to later construct the meaning of an extreme grade since
that meaning cannot be extrapolated from the difference in performance
represented by various grades closer to the mean, the ones forming the bulk
of the reader's experience.
The harm done by nonlinear transfbrmations of raw scores into final
grades might be brought home by considering the "grading" done by U.S.
News and World Reports annual rankings of law schools. In the past, U.S. News
turned most cardinal scores into ordinal scores. For example, Ivy School of
Law might have a bar-pass rate of 89 percent, while Big Ten College of Law has
a bar-pass rate of 91 percent. If 29 of the 180 schools had a bar-pass rate of 90
percent, Big Ten might have a rank of 40th while Ivy ranked 70th out of 180.
This would make a mountain of impact out of a molehill of difference in what
mattered, the actual rate at which students passed the bar." As a result,
schools' rankings could change from year to year even though the schools
themselves had not changed in any meaningful way. Failing to maintain
proportionality in the transformation of subscores led to inaccurate commu-
nication. U.S. News did not fully understand the disadvantages of its method
when it published its early rankings."' It appears that the magazine has now
corrected this error by using cardinal scores rather than converting them to
ranks before combining them."
2. Common Uses of Nonlinear Scales
There are good examples of and uses for nonlinear scales. The octave, the
decibel, the pH scale, and the Richter scale are nonlinear. Yet three of those
61. At one time, U.S. News defended its rankings as being about the same as what schools do to
students. See Mitchell Berger, Why the U.S. News and World Report Law School Rankings Are
Both Useful and important, 511. Legal Educ. 487,499 (2001). Berger includes in his defense
of the U.S. News rankings the statement that "no rankings system -inchtding the grading
system used in law school-is perfect." /d. at 500. Isn't it possible that there are important
differences in the degree of imperfection? Although it is true that many teachers fail to
maintain proportionalily, I doubt that any law teachers (or schools) have violated this
principle as egregiously as did U.S. News in its early rankings. It was partictularly annoying to
see U.S. News claim they are doing the same thing that we do, when they were clearly unaware
of hoth how we do it and how to do it right.
62. The purpose of the rankilng a)proach to the subscores was to prevent any large deviations on
some criteria, like library size, from swamping other criteria. The better approach, as U.S.
News now knows, is to use logarithms. For at discussion of its methodology, see Gayle Garrett,
Our Method Explained, U.S. News & World Report, Apr. 15, 2002, at 55.
63. The page on "methodology" at the U.S. News Web site does not give a complete description of
the method currently used, much less the methodology. See <http://www.tisnews.com/
tisnews/edtt/grad/rankings/abott/031iwnmeth.htm> (last visited Feb. 10, 2003). The method
in past years was not spelled out in detail either, but Joe Hoffinann and I figured out their
method byworking with the data and the results reached by U.S. News. I then called U.S. News
to confirm that they had indeed done what Hoffmann and I had figured must have been
done.
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are defined by reference to a linear scale, and the other can be defined that
way. If we are going to use a nonlinear scale, we ought to at least agree on its
definition. To be consistent, any nonlinear scale will probably have to be
defined in terms of a linear scale, because those are often more easily verifi-
able. In other words, if we define the scale nonlinearly, who can say whether
the A interval is too far from the B interval to be consistent with another
course? But there seems to be no reason to avoid a linear scale in favor of a
nonlinear one. The usual reason to do so, that one extreme end of the scale is
too far from the center, is not present in our grading of students. In law
schools we rarely have some students scoring 10 times the score of other
students, and never is one student's score 100 times that of another student.
One good reason to use a nonlinear grading scale would be to conform to
the expectations of students or employers or admissions officers, that is, to
communicate better with some audience. Is nonlinearity the usual assumption
or expectation? Although there are many grading scales, perhaps the most
common one makes 90 to 100 an A and 60 to 69 a D. 4 Based on my informal
talks with students, I think that most college graduates, unless told otherwise,
assume that the difference between an A and a B is the same as the difference
between a B and a C, and so forth. Given the familiarity of linear scales, the
burden would seem to be on those wanting to use a nonlinear scale to show
that it better conforms to readers' expectations, or in some other way allows
for better communication.
Another reason a teacher might wish to avoid giving different grades to
closely spaced exams is that she is not confident her data mean that much. In
other words, she likes to draw lines in the gaps. The benefit of doing this, as I've
said, is that she does not falsely imply that two students close in actual
performance (the bottom B and top B-) performed quite differently. (Note that
this benefit decreases dramatically as the number of grades increases, i.e., when
a finer grading scale is employed.) The undesirable flip side is that by stretching
intervals to draw lines in the gaps a teacher also says that two students, the top
and bottom B students, for example, are the same when they were significantly
different. Or when she squeezes the B- interval to draw lines in the gaps, she says
that the top C+ is further from the bottom B student than he really is. At best,
drawing lines in the gaps tells a more accurate picture for some comparisons but
a less accurate picture for other comparisons even within the same class, to say
nothing of the difficulties it creates in making comparisons of GPAs. Drawing
lines in the gaps carries no benefit large enough tojustify the horizontal and
vertical inequity that occurs when GPAs are calculated from grades given by
teachers with disproportional grading scales.6 5
64. At the ends this scale is not linear, but scores in the nonlinear region are uncommon. When
they do occur, however, the scale creates some problems. Take, for example, the student who
gets 29 and 90 on two exams, each of which is "50 percent of the grade." The final grade, as
calculated by some teachers, will be an F even though an A and an F would average to a C for
other teachers.
65. The issue of skew was mentioned above. Since skewness is measured with a statistic that is
based on all the performances in the class, it too could be standardized by schools with some
beneficial effect. But doing so would often run afoul of this principle of maintaining
proportionality.
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Rankings of students are themselves nonlinear transformations of grades.
When we )utblish class ranks, we create the possibility of error in communica-
tion. The 100th student is probably not very far behind the 90th in GPA, but
the ranking disparity makes them look significantly different.' This problem
might be cured by publishing the overall SPS for each student along with a
distribution of the SPSs for all students. But even if a school chooses not to
address the problems of communication stemming from its final ranking, it
should attempt to prevent the problems of disproportionality at earlier stages
in the process, for they compound the potential for miscommunication by
changing not only the distance between students but also the actual order of
the students in the class.
F Keep the No-Credit Grade Reasonably Close to the Mean
A closely related principle is that the failing grade on the school's grading
scale should not be too far firom the mean grade. The fact that grades
communicate relative performance does not mean that they cannot also
comTmunicate absolute performance. Many teachers have the sense that a
certain level of performance is simply too poor to deserve credit for the
course. Such a teacher might wish to give an F because he thinks the pupil
(rarely a student) really deserves no credit fci the course. If the grade that
denies credit, usually the F, is far below the mean, the teacher's use of the
grade implies that the student's performance is far below the mean.
At some schools the F is more than six standard deviations below the
mean. 7 An F on such a scale implies that the student has performed much
worse than the average. It is likely, however, that the failing student's perfor-
mance was not that different fr-om the mean. Forced to work within such a
grading scale, teachers with high standards for what is passing work are put to
an unfortunate choice between saying that the performance is passing when
they think it is not and saying it is poorer than that of other students to a
degree that is equally untrue.
There is an additional problem with the distant F. When the student's GPA
is calculated, that F takes on much greater weight than it deserves. This is
essentially a narrow instance of the point made above that a teacher who
spreads his grades broadly gives his course more weight in the GPAs. The net
result is that the teacher whose only intent is to say that the performance was
66. The unfairness of this rank-order (tlrnanient migtt he counterbalanced hy the fact that
rankings create large i nicen tives for many, bi i10 tall, StdCeitis to wor'k hard.
67. On at normal distributiOn, which this is not, a random perform nance that far below the mean
is about one case in a billion. Freind & Simon, supra note 21, at 523. Even the weirdest
imaginable distribution will have few sihidenLs imori e than 6 standard deviations firom iie
mean. Chebyshev proved that the proportion ofhc data that lie within kstandard deviations
of the mean is at least (I-/k^2). Hence, the number of observations outside of 6 standard
deviations is at most 1/36 for any possible distribition. For nearly all sets of data, the aCtual
percentage of tdata beyond 6 Y- is imu Cieh less than that. See id. at 78-79. In the 2,000 exams I
have graded with a point system in the last t0 years, I have not seent a single one. Thus, even
accontinig for the fact that ot11 rdistributions may not be normat for the reasons given above,
a gradce 6 Y' shlr of the titean ought to be rare.
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not good enough for credit may inadvertently push that failing student a long
way down in class rank, much further down than that student deserved to be
pushed by a poor performance in a single course. To avoid this, teachers
should have available a grade that tells the reader that the performance did
not deserve credit without implying that the student performed so far from
the mean that we expect to see such performance only once in a blue moon. 5
There are some contexts in which teachers may be especially likely to apply
fixed rather than relative criteria in assigning grades. If the faculty has de-
cided, for example, that certain courses must be passed in order for a student
to graduate, teachers of those courses should probably feel that they have
been given a special obligation to determine whether the students did indeed
learn enough of the subject matter to have cleared that hurdle. Especially if
the course is mandatory and cannot be repeated, if there are any such courses,
the requirement would seem to assume that some sort of absolute standard
ought to be applied in grading."' If the failing grade is too far from the mean,
the responsible teacher of a low-scoring student is in a difficult bind.7"
G. Avoid Grade Inflation
Once we have established the principles above, it becomes obvious that
grade inflation generates a number of problems. When some teachers increase
grades, they create incentives for students to take their courses rather than
other courses. At the margin, the higher grades in a grade-inflated course will
cause some students to take that course instead of a course that would have
been better for their educational development. That in turn puts pressure on
other teachers to inflate their grades because many teachers want to have
students in their elective classes. With time, there is pressure on other schools
to inflate their grades so that their graduates have a fair shot in the competitive
education and employment markets. Thus, grade inflation spirals.
One result of inflation is that grades are harder to compare over time,
although such comparisons might not be terribly meaningful for other rea-
sons.7 1 In addition, grades are harder for the readers to interpret because they
68. The discussion has assumed that credit for a course will be tied to grades in some way.
Another way to solve the problem would be to have teachers determine two separate issues,
the grade and whether the student receives credit lor the course.
69. If a diploma carries with it the right to practice law in a state, it might be appropriate for the
teachers in schools granting such diplomas to calculate their grades according to some fixed
standard. The sane point could be extended to all law schools on the theory that we are one
hurdle that must be crossed to gain admission to the bar in most states, but the vast
differences in students across schools (not to mention the teaching) make it nearly impos-
sible for any of us to have confidence in otr ability to set an appropriate standard based on
who should be allowed into the har.
70. The teacher of a pass/fail student might be especially troubled. It is possible to argue that the
level of performance requir ed for a pass/fail student to pass should be higher than the level
requirCd for a regular student to pass. If a different standard is not applied, the pass/fail
student will have almost no incentive to study. If a faculty takes that position, then teachers
become more likely to award F's, and the esuting F's are quite misleading as signals of the
relative performance of the studencs.
71. Teachers and students both change over time. For example, most schools have more
competitive admission requirements than they had in the past.
journal of Legal Education
do not know how much inflation has occurred. People who read lots of
transcripts from a particular institution should have no trouble keeping up
with the shifting meanings of the grading language, but others will not know
how to interpret the message .1 2 As meanings shift at different rates within
institutions, it becomes even harder to make comparisons of students across
institutions.
Another problem created by grade inflation is that it reduces the number of
useful grade intervals, turning fine grading scales into coarse grading scales. As
was shown above, coarser grading scales create serious problems of injustice in
addition to ambiguity in communication.7" Still another problem created by
inflation is that itwarps proportional grading scales, with all of the concomitant
problems of unfairness and inefficiency in communication noted in the
discussion of disproportional scales. The absence of proportionality was prob-
ably not as large a problem back when C was the average and an F need not have
been much rarer than an A. Teachers in those days had the elbow room to fail
students when they fell a couple of standard deviations below the average.
Ironically, grade inflation can be especially harmful to students on the
bottom rungs of the class-rank ladder. When the mean moves up, it puts the
teacher of weak students in a bind. He has two choices, retain linearity and
give no failing grades, or abandon linearity. If he has a strong sense of what is
required for passing performance, he will refuse to move the bottom grades
up into the passing intervals, even though that is where the bottom students
belong if proportionality is to be maintained. Grade inflation has elevated and
compressed the scale so much that, as I've said, the failing grade at IU Law is
now about six standard deviations from the mean. The chances that a student's
true score was that far from the mean are minuscule. When B is the average
and the standard deviation is half the distance from B to A, an F should be
exceptionally rare.
Schools might respond to grade inflation by raising the average required
for graduation. Unfortunately, not all of them have similarly raised the grade
required for passing performance. The no-credit interval has been the only
portion of the scale not to inflate, stretching the whole scale beyond sensibil-
ity. This has dramatically shifted the role of the teacher. Instead of being asked
to determine whether a student gets credit for the course, the teacher is now
asked to determine whether it will be difficult for the student to retain his
scholarship without taking a disproportionate number of courses from easy
graders. In some cases the F may even make it hard for the student to
graduate. It is doubtful that the teacher of a single course has enough data to
justify giving a grade that prevents a student from continuing in school. The
teacher grading her own students should not have to shoulder the burden of
justifying such a drastic result when all the teacher wanted to do was say No
Credit for her course.
72. The fact that almost 90 percent of Flarvard's graduiates qualified for "honors" must have
come as a surprise to at least a few uninformed observers. See Anemona Hlartocollis, Harvard
Faculty Votes to Put the Excellence Back iii the A, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2002, at A20.
73. As grades distinguish less, employers might be inclined to shift their reliance to exams that
do distinguish, but do so perhaps even less reliably, such as the mutistate bar exam.
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It is possible that some teachers offer courses with a high minimum grade
because they perceive that the abnormally low grades given in other courses
have more impact on the GPA than they should have. Thus another vicious
circle is born. Rather than taking that vigilante approach, we should correct
defective grading scales by increasing the minimum grade required for credit.
This would not be hard to do. GPAs could continue to be calculated as they
are now, but credits completed toward graduation would not include any
courses in which the student received a grade lower than C (for example). If
we were to do that, responsible teachers wanting to say No Credit could do so
without giving students grades that should be statistically impossible.
I am not making any argument about how much grade inflation there has
been-an issue on which there has been some debate on our campus. Nor
have I made any attempt to marshal the reasons grade inflation might be
appropriate, such as the fact that at many institutions the students admitted
are better qualified than in the past, or that peer schools have inflated their
grades so much that it would be miscommunication not to inflate the grades
in a laggard school. (Another way to deal with the latter problem is to adopt an
unusual scale.) In other words, I am not trying to argue that a school should
squeeze all of the inflation out of the grading scale any more than the Federal
Reserve should try to squeeze all of the inflation out of the economy. I am
arguing, however, that grade inflation leads to miscommunication, which can
be both unfair and inefficient. If a school allows inflation, it should take steps
to minimize that potential.
Any time a faculty imposes grading constraints on its members, it risks
forcing miscommunication. If the class is abnormal, the constrained teacher is
unable to send an accurate message of comparative performance because she
cannot award abnormal grades. On the other hand, if the class is normal, an
unconstrained teacher with a defective assessment instrument might send
inaccurate messages of comparative performance by sending abnormal grades.
One key question, the question some faculties have failed to ask, is which risk
is greater. Is it more likely that the teacher's instrument is miscalibrated, or that
the class itself is abnormal? For classes of many students, the answer will usually
be that it is more likely that the assessment instrument is defective. For small
classes, the risks become closer. Because these risks are somewhat speculative,
increased uniformity in grading will not necessarily lead to increased accuracy
in communication. Indeed, grading constraints will undoubtedly lead to some
sets of grades that are less accurate than they would have been if the teacher
had been unconstrained. But the issue is not whether uniformity will improve
matters in every case, but rather whether it improves communication in the
long run. Forced uniformity will often increase accuracy, and overall the odds
lie against complete professorial freedom in grading.
I have spoken of uniformity as if it must be forced upon the faculty because
there are incentives for teachers to deviate from norms if they are allowed to
do so. Nevertheless, a very collegial faculty might accomplish as much with
informal norms as would be accomplished by binding rules. And even if
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informal norms or formal rules are flouted by some, partial adherence has
some beneficial effect. Generally, the more adherence to the principles above
the better, regardless of the source or formality of the constraint.
Assessment of student performance is never perfect. Choosing the types of
instruments for measuring performance will always involve tradeoffs. Never-
theless, we should try to avoid exacerbating deficiencies in our assessment by
making errors in the numerical methods we use for coming to summary
comparative statistics. Judgments about proper grading practices must take
serious account of the context in which our grades reside. If we are to give
grades and class ranks, let them be fairly calculated. We teach that justice
matters; let us do our best when it is our turn to hand down the decisions.
